云模型在雷达干扰资源多目标优化配置中的应用

鉴于干扰效果/效益评估在雷达干扰资源优化分配中的重要地位,提出了一种基于云模型和匈牙利算法的雷达干扰资源优化分配模型。利用一维云模型单条件单规则发生器和逆向云发生器构建了评估指标干扰效果推理器,利用基于风险态度因子的云模型映射函数定义了云模型之间距离的度量方法。提出了一种基于云模型与逼近理想解法的雷达干扰效益矩阵求解方法,最后运用匈牙利算法实现了干扰资源优化分配。将所建模型应用到干扰资源分配中,结果表明该模型能够较好的处理评估中的不确定性知识,是合理、可行的。     

信息化条件下空战威胁评估指标体系

目标威胁评估是空战决策研究的重要组成部分,评价指标是进行威胁评估的前提和基础。根据现代空战的特点,借鉴网络中心战思想,从空间态势、物理域、信息域、认知域4个角度,构建了信息化条件下空战目标威胁评估指标体系,并对指标体系进行了完备性、合理性、有效性检验。通过实例分析表明威胁评估指标能较好地反映信息化条件下空中目标的实际威胁,为空战决策研究提供参考。     

边境安全风险分析系统的构建研究

提出了信息化背景下边境安全风险情报分析的基本概念及其内涵,论述了信息化背景下边境安全风险分析系统的架构和面向边境安全风险分析的信息组织方式。     

Return policy: Hassle‐free or your money‐back guarantee?

This article compares the profitability of two pervasively adopted return policies—money‐back guarantee and hassle‐free policies. In our model, a seller sells to consumers with heterogeneous valuations and hassle costs. Products are subject to quality risk, and product misfit can only be observed post‐purchase. While the hassle‐free policy is cost advantageous from the seller's viewpoint, a money‐back guarantee allows the seller to fine‐tune the consumer hassle on returning the product. Thus, when the two return policies lead to the same consumer behaviors, the hassle‐free policy dominates. Conversely, a money‐back guarantee can be more profitable even if on average, high‐valuation consumers experience a lower hassle cost than the low‐valuation ones. The optimal hassle cost can be higher when product quality gets improved; thus, it is not necessarily a perfect proxy or signal of the seller's quality. We further allow the seller to adopt a mixture of these policies, and identify the concrete operating regimes within which these return policies are optimal among more flexible policies. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 403–417, 2014     

具有不完全信息语言多指标电子对抗计划优选方法

针对指标权重信息不完全且指标值为语言评价信息的电子对抗行动计划优选问题,给出了一种新的决策分析方法。首先建立并规范化了电子对抗行动计划的评价指标;其次给出了计划的优选步骤,其核心是通过计算理想点与计划值的距离、建立线性规划模型,确定指标权重;将语言评价信息转化为三角模糊数,相应地建立可能度,进而获得计划的综合评价值。最后通过算例分析说明了该方法的合理性和有效性。     

On the Determinants of Terrorism Risk Concern in Europe

We investigate whether differences in terrorism risk are mirrored on terrorism risk perception across European countries for the period 2003–2007. We find that the average propensity for terrorism risk concern is affected by actual risk levels. Country and individual heterogeneity contribute substantially to the variation of observed risk perception. Singles and individuals with white collar jobs are less likely to mention terrorism as one of the most pressing issues their country faces, while political positioning towards the right makes it more likely to be concerned about terrorism. As far as competing risks are concerned, we find that the likelihood terrorism is mentioned, decreases with spending on pensions as a percentage of GDP being higher. Finally, based on the Bayesian framework, we also examined the formation of terrorism risk perceptions, and decompose the observed country-level time series of terrorism activity into a long- and a short-run component. We concluded that the observed risk perception variation is only explained by the long-term trend of terrorism activity countries face.     

Performance measurement in military operations: information versus incentives

We explore the impact of strategic assessment efforts on military organizations at war. To do so, we construct a model to explore the impact of a principal’s choice among imperfect performance metrics for a military operation. In doing so, the principal must consider both the incentivizing and informational properties of the metric. We show the conditions under which uncertainty regarding the nature of the agent, as well as uncertainty regarding the operational environment, drives a metric choice that induces pathological behavior from the agent. More specifically, a poor metric choice can create an overly optimistic assessment and end up prolonging the conflict. We illustrate the model’s insights in the cases of World War II and the Vietnam War.     

NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

The funding of international nuclear risk mitigation is ad hoc, voluntary, and unpredictable, offering no transparent explanation of who is financially responsible for the task or why. Among many non-nuclear-armed states, this exacerbates a sense of injustice surrounding what they see as a discriminatory nuclear regime. The resulting erosion of the regime's legitimacy undermines support for efforts to prevent nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism. This article proposes a transparent, equitable “nuclear-user-pays” system as a logical means of reversing this trend. This system envisions states contributing financially to international efforts to mitigate nuclear risks at a level relative to the degree of nuclear risks created by each state. “National nuclear risk factors” would be calculated by tabulating the risks associated with each state's civilian and military nuclear activities, as well as advanced dual-use and nuclear-capable missile activities, multiplying the severity of each risk by the probability of it occurring, and combining these results. A nuclear-user-pays model would create financial incentives for national and corporate nuclear risk mitigation, boost legitimacy and support for nuclear control efforts among non-nuclear-armed states, assist in preventing nuclear weapons dissemination and terrorism, and advance nuclear disarmament by helping progressively devalue nuclear weapons.     

图像融合的客观质量评估

随着图像融合技术在武器自动化系统中的广泛应用,图像融合的质量评估问题,即图像融合的性能评估问题,在融合方案的选择中具有重要地位。由于人工主观的图像融合评估具有很大的工程化和自动化难度,国际上研究人员都将研究目标投向了客观图像融合质量评估的研究中。从历史发展的角度系统地回顾了客观图像融合质量评估的发展历程和研究现状,对近十年来的客观图像融合质量评估方法进行了分类和分析。同时,对于国际上几种流行的图像融合质量评估方法的性能测定思路进行了介绍。对于图像融合质量评估现状的分析和讨论有助于我们对图像融合的质量评估方法进行更深入的研究。     

UN-Consistent: A Comparison of Australia's Military Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda

This article seeks to compare Australia's involvement in two key 1990s peace missions: those to Somalia in 1992–93 and Rwanda in 1994–95. While there are many similarities between the two missions in terms of time, scale and theatre, the differences are more important. Both missions are usually recalled as failures despite the Australian troops having been extremely successful in their roles during both deployments. Moreover the experiences with intervention in Africa seem to have forever blighted Australian participation in peace missions on that continent.